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Mouvement laïque québécois v.
Saguenay: Neutrality and Narrative
Victor M. Muñiz-Fraticelli

For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture.1
The controversy over the recitation of prayer at the sessions of the
municipal council of the city of Saguenay laid bare the tensions between
religious neutrality and historical identity that continue to play out in the
constitutional politics of Quebec. At stake is control of the narrative of
what Quebec was and is becoming, and thus control of the meaning of
those symbols and norms that shape and direct its normative order.
Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City)2 is as much a case
about constitutional doctrine as it is about the narrative of secularization in
Canadian and (especially) Quebec society, and the ongoing displacement
of a tacit Christian identity for a multicultural and civic ethos. In many
ways, MLQ v. Saguenay is a distinctly Québécois controversy: It is the
culmination of a long and often tumultuous struggle to define the place of
Roman Catholicism in the civil and political life of the province after
centuries of ecclesiastical hegemony and decades of reaction against this
hegemony. The players in the drama were not new to the stage, but had
been intervening in public life for years, most recently in the
Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to
Cultural Differences — the Bouchard-Taylor commission.3 The
complaint that led to the actual case was originally brought before a
forum charged with promoting the 1976 Quebec Charter of Human Rights

Victor M. Muñiz-Fraticelli is Associate Professor of Law and Political Science at McGill
University. I want to thank Anastasia Berwald for invaluable research assistance, and the
participants of the Osgoode Constitutional Cases conference and an anonymous reviewer for helpful
comments.
1
Robert M. Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term — Foreword: Nomos and Narrative”
(1983) 97 Harvard L. Rev. 4, at 4 [hereinafter “Cover”].
2
[2015] S.C.J. No. 16, 2015 SCC 16 (S.C.C.), revg [2013] J.Q. no 5220 (Que. C.A.)
[hereinafter “MLQ v. Saguenay”].
3
Quebec, Fonder l’Avenir : Le temps de la conciliation (Québec : Commission de
consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux differences culturelles, 2008) (Gérard
Bouchard & Charles Taylor).
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and Freedoms4 rather than the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.5 And it was, of course, Quebec justices who most directly
weighed in on the debate, all the way to Gascon J. who wrote for the
majority in the Supreme Court.
The Court’s decision in MLQ v. Saguenay — which declared
unconstitutional the practice of confessional (and perhaps all) prayer at
city council meetings — is not especially surprising or controversial.
Popular opinion in Quebec or Canada does not favour confessional
prayer at council meetings, and a majority of Canadians would prefer
that there were no invocation at all, even if a majority finds acceptable
non-denominational prayers that reference “God” generically.6 And the
little jurisprudence that existed on municipal prayers prior to MLQ v.
Saguenay, while mixed, rejected the more overtly confessional orations
and was suspicious even of the more generic. What is interesting about
the MLQ decision is the reasoning of the Supreme Court, which
consolidates a shift in the discussion of religion in civic life away from a
focus on coercion of individual belief and towards a more general
standard of state neutrality.
This shift is not new; scholars like Richard Moon and Benjamin
Berger have been tracking it for years.7 But in MLQ v. Saguenay it is laid
bare, which makes it easier to see some problems with the Court’s
underlying constitutional theory. I will only discuss two here. First,
the standard of neutrality may well be the application of freedom of
religion mandated by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
other quasi-constitutional instruments — the section 15 guarantee of
equal treatment would suggest this — but the Supreme Court seems
uninterested in attaching it too firmly to the constitutional text, preferring
to derive it from a broader political or sociological theory; this is a
problem when interpreting a written constitution.8 Second, the Supreme
CQLR, c. C-12 [hereinafter “Quebec Charter”].
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
6
Interestingly, nine in 10 Canadians don’t seem to mind the reference to God in the
national anthem. See Angus Reid Institute, “Prayer in Canadian Public Life: A Nation Divided”,
online: <http://angusreid.org/public-prayer/>.
7
Richard Moon, “Government Support for Religious Practice” in Richard Moon, ed., Law
and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), at
217; Benjamin Berger, Law's Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), at 84.
8
Even critics of entrenched constitutionalism understand that there is something different to a
written document: “there are words there which may (or may not) actually have a plain meaning —
whereas in the case of other sources of law, hermeneutical difficulties get going on a somewhat
4
5
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Court insists on assimilating all provincial constitutional or quasiconstitutional rights instruments to the federal Charter, eliding important
differences in historical experience and legislative intent; this is a problem
for federalism. Attention to the interplay between rule and narrative in
constituting the normative universe of constitutional law — a model
famously proposed by Robert Cover over three decades ago — would
do much to reground constitutional principles in the text of the Charter
and to allow variation between different provincial rights instruments.

I. MUNICIPAL PRAYER IN SAGUENAY
The controversy in MLQ v. Saguenay can be told as a sequence of acts
in an ongoing drama. In the cold open, we fade into scene at the opening
of a municipal council session in the city of Saguenay. A statue of the
Sacred Heart and a crucifix hang on the walls of the building. The mayor
rises and leads the councillors in prayer. “Au nom du Père, du Fils et du
Saint-Esprit”, he intones, while making the sign of the cross in the
Roman Catholic fashion. Some brief words follow, commending the
council to God and asking for guidance in deliberation, and the same
formula — the appeal to the Christian Trinity and the sign of the cross —
closes the invocation. The language of the prayer varies with time, but it
is always transparently Catholic, if not in words at least in the ritual that
surrounds it. The mayor who leads it, Jean Tremblay, is unapologetic
about this, and the vast majority of the population of Saguenay seems to
support him.
Jean Tremblay has been mayor of Saguenay since the city’s formal
creation in 2002, following the municipal merger. For five years before
then he had been mayor of Chicoutimi, now the major borough of
Saguenay. By all electoral accounts, he has been a popular mayor,
winning each election by comfortable margins, despite running on the
federalist Liberal Party ticket in a largely nationalist region. He has been
attentive to the strong current of cultural nationalism in his constituency,
a current that has flowed from the days of Union Nationale to part of the
coalition that sustains the present-day nationalist parties. This is the heart
of Quebec’s cultural nationalism, rural and traditionalist, rooted in the
different basis.” J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 79.
As I will mention later, it is also part of the narrative of a written constitution that certain words (and
not others) were deliberately put down on a charter, and that this is an act of normative significance
when interpreting constitutional principles.
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agricultural and industrial heartlands of the province and proudly
immersed in four centuries of Catholic hegemony.
The dramatic tension rises as one resident of the city, Alain Simoneau,
who feels uncomfortable with the religious invocation, challenges the
mayor and demands an end to the practice. The mayor refuses, and
Mr. Simoneau files a complaint with the Commission des droits de la
personne et des droits de la jeunesse. He is assisted by the Mouvement
laïque québécois (“MLQ”). The MLQ is the product of a reaction among
urban intellectual elites against the Catholic hegemony that Mayor
Tremblay wants to preserve.9 The group’s program represents another
strain of Quebec nationalism — the urban intellectuals with republican
sympathies who achieved the Quiet Revolution and broke with the moral
authority of the Church and the colluding power of federalist politicians
and financial elites. This strain looks to the history that might have been,
had Quebec not been denied by a mere 30 years the Revolution that
broke the First Estate and made France into une république laïque. The
model of secularism that the MLQ wants to implement is a French
republican model that took full form at the turn of the 20th century, when
the Radical Republican party suppressed all religious orders, closed all
religious schools, confiscated church property, and turned control of all
religious associations to laypersons.10 The MLQ’s position also aligns it
with the sovereigntist movement for a number of overlapping reasons:
the force of Quebec’s rejection of the Church after the Quiet Revolution,
versus Canada’s more gradual and less dramatic secularization; the
republican opposition to the monarchy; the secularist rejection of the
same Crown which, in the United Kingdom (though not in Canada), is at
the head of a church.11
In his complaint, Simoneau and the MLQ request the cessation of the
prayer and a removal of all religious symbols from the municipal council
chambers, on the grounds that they represent discriminatory interference
with Mr. Simoneau’s rights under sections 3 and 10 of the Quebec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, respectively the guarantee of
freedom of religion, and the “right to full and equal recognition and
9
M. Geoffroy, “Le Mouvement laïque Québécois et la laïcité au Canada” in P. Singaravélou,
ed., Laïcité: enjeux et pratiques (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2007), at 95.
10
Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association, JO, 2 July 1901, 4025 ; Loi du 7
juillet 1904 relative à la suppression de l’enseignement congréganiste, B.A.M.I.P. n° 1630, p. 143146 ; Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la separation des Églises et de l’État, JO, 11 December
1905, 7205.
11
Lost between these, of course, are non-Christian religious minorities, issued from recent
migration and anathemized by both sides.
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exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion
or preference based on […] religion”.12 The Commission finds sufficient
evidence for a claim, and the MLQ takes the case before the Quebec
Human Rights Tribunal for relief.
The Saguenay city council counters by unanimously approving a
by-law that reaffirms its commitment to the municipal prayer, arguing
that the recitation is a tradition in the city, and that the councillors wish
to continue the practice in the exercise of their own individual rights to
freedom of religion, conscience and expression. They also codify the
language of the prayer in the by-law, and provide for a delay to the
official start of the council session in order to accommodate councillors
and members of the public who do not want to participate in the prayer.13
The mayor and the councillors, however, continue the practice of
invoking the Christian Trinity and making the sign of the cross before
and after the ceremony.
The Quebec Human Rights Tribunal receives the Commission’s report
and attempts to defuse the tension by calling the city’s bluff. The Tribunal
understandably finds the prayer — both the original practice and the one
codified in the by-law — to be religious in content and in purpose,
especially given the obviously Catholic gestures that surround it; in
consequence, it violates the state’s duty of neutrality. It orders the mayor
and council to cease the recitation. It rules the by-law itself invalid and
goes further by requiring all religious symbols be removed from the
council chamber (which had been a request of the MLQ, but which the
Commission had declined to investigate). It determines that the neutrality
of the state requires complete abstention of religious expression in the
public space, whether in prayer or in the portrayal of symbols.
The action then moves to the Quebec Court of Appeal, which reverses
the Tribunal’s decision. Its reasons are worth going over in detail,
because they represent a contested but widespread position in the debate
over religious expression in Quebec. Instead of the strict separationist
view espoused by the Tribunal, the appellate court preferred a more
flexible notion. The neutrality of the state requires the equal treatment of
12

Supra, note 4.
The prayer enacted in the by-law, in translation, reads:
Almighty God, we thank You for the great blessings that You have given to Saguenay and
its citizens, including freedom, opportunities for development and peace. Guide us in our
deliberations as City Council members and help us to be aware of our duties and
responsibilities. Grant us the wisdom, knowledge and understanding to allow us to
preserve the benefits enjoyed by our City for all to enjoy and so that we may make wise
decisions. Amen.
13
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citizens, and the independence of governmental officials and public
institutions from religious influence.14 But absolute neutrality, the Court
claimed, was impossible given the religious history of the province,15 and
not required by then-existent Supreme Court precedent.16 A better concept,
the judges held, would be the notion of “neutralité bienveillante”
(translated as “benevolent neutrality”),17 which allows for state support for
religious institutions as long as all religions (and, presumably, at least
some non-religious positions) are treated equally. The phrase, referenced to
José Woerhling, contemplated the state’s financial support for religious
institutions,18 most notably denominational schools, but the Court of
Appeal appears to extend it to support for a historical religious heritage,
and perhaps also to individual manifestations of religiosity by public
officials — so long as all religions are equitably treated. The alternative,
favoured by the MLQ, would demand the voiding of all religious signs
from public space.19
The Court of Appeal ultimately tries to strike a balance between the
only Canadian cases that are directly on point — two Ontarian judicial
decisions on municipal prayer: Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town)20 and
Allen v. Renfrew (County)21 (we will flash back to these later). For now, it
is sufficient to know that the former decision, of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, found that an overtly Christian prayer recited at a municipal
meeting was impermissible under the Charter, but left open the
possibility that a non-sectarian prayer might pass constitutional scrutiny.
The later decision, from the Ontario Superior Court, took the Ontario
14

Saguenay (Ville de) c. Mouvement laïque québécois, [2013] J.Q. no 5220, 2013 QCCA
936 at para. 64 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Saguenay QCCA”].
15
Id., at para. 65.
16
Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérome-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine, [2004]
S.C.J. No. 48, 2004 SCC 48 (S.C.C.), revg [2002] J.Q. no 4728 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter
“Lafontaine ”] and L. (S.) v. Commission scolaire des Chênes, [2012] S.C.J. No. 7, 2012 SCC 7
(S.C.C.), affg [2010] J.Q. no 1355, 1356, 1357 (Que. C.A.).
17
Saguenay QCCA, supra, note 14, at para. 77.
18
José Woehrling, “Quelle place pour la réligion dans les institutions publiques ?” in JeanFrançois Gaudreault-DesBiens, ed., Le droit, la religion, et le raisonnable (Montreal : Éditions
Thémis, 2009) 115, at 127.
19
This is consistent with the organization’s position in Rosenberg v. Outremont (City),
[2001] Q.J. No. 2858 (Que. S.C.), in which the MLQ supported the City of Outremont’s attempt to
dismantle an eruv — which the Superior Court itself defines as “a notional concept by which an
otherwise open area is closed by the attachment of barely visible wires or strings to freestanding
structures” (at para. 7) — erected on private property and causing no one “any inconvenience or
undue hardship” (at para. 44). I thank an anonymous commenter for pointing this out.
20
[1999] O.J. No. 3524, 47 O.R. (3d) 301 (Ont. C.A.), revg [1998] O.J. No. 29 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) [hereinafter “Freitag”].
21
[2004] O.J. No. 1231, 69 O.R. (3d) 742 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Allen”].
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Court of Appeal at its word and allowed a town council to continue
reciting a prayer that, while non-sectarian, still mentioned God.22 Among
the reasons given by the Ontario Superior Court are the preamble to the
Charter, which declares that “Canada is founded upon principles that
recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law”, and the persistence
of prayer in the House of Commons.
The MLQ’s petition in Saguenay, however, was based on the Quebec
Charter, which contains no reference to God. Nonetheless, the Quebec
Court of Appeal pointed to numerous symbolic references that retain
religious content (the flag of Quebec, the national anthem, the motto of
Montreal, or the large illuminated cross on the summit of Mount-Royal)
and to a resolution passed unanimously by the National Assembly of
Quebec asserting its “attachment to our religious and historical
patrimony represented notably by the crucifix in our blue hall and our
armorial devices which adorn our institutions”.23 These are historical
evidence, the judges held, of the religious dimension of Québec’s history,
but do not compromise the neutrality of the state. The appellate court
also found support in European and American decisions — Lautsi v.
Italy24 and Marsh v. Chambers.25 In the former, the European Court of
Human Rights allowed crucifixes to remain posted on the walls of Italian
public school classrooms, deeming them a passive symbol that did not
have an indoctrinating effect, and represented mainly a historical
recognition of the country’s majority religion. In the latter case, the
United States Supreme Court refused to declare unconstitutional the
practice of opening the Nebraska state legislative session with a prayer
led by a chaplain. The “unbroken practice for two centuries in the
National Congress and for more than a century in Nebraska and in
many other states”26 was reason to continue the practice despite the
constitutional proscription to “make no law respecting an establishment
of religion”. In the end, the Court of Appeal was able to rely on
ambiguities in the case law, in the historical practice of the federal and
provincial governments, and even in comparative law to alter the
narrative of religious neutrality.
22
As the Quebec Court of Appeal observes, this prayer is more or less identical in wording
to the Saguenay prayer, as both were based on the prayer recited at the House of Commons.
23
Saguenay QCCA, supra, note 14, at para. 102, citing Québec, Assemblée nationale,
Procès-verbaux, 38e lég, 1re sess, No. 87 (22 mai 2008), at 840.
24
[GC], No. 30814/06 (March 18, 2011).
25
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
26
Id., at 795.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MUNICIPAL
PRAYER BEFORE MLQ
Before reaching the last scene in the drama, we should briefly flash
back to the state of the law at the time the controversy started. Prior
to the Supreme Court decision in MLQ v. Saguenay, there was little
precedent to guide Canadian municipalities on the constitutionality
of reciting prayers at town and city meetings. Only two recent Ontario
cases stood out — Freitag v. Penetanguishene27 and Allen v. Renfrew28 —
which, although they appealed to a common norm, nonetheless reached
contrary conclusions.
In Freitag, a non-Christian resident of the Town of Penetanguishene
challenged an apparently long-standing practice of having the mayor open
the municipal council meetings with the Lord’s Prayer.29 The practice
was not mandated by any municipal ordinance or by-law, but was done at
the mayor’s discretion in order to bring a “moral tone” to the deliberation
of the council.30 Nonetheless, this discretion was exercised in light of the
mayor’s statutory authority to open and conduct town meetings, and
therefore constituted a governmental act. It was not — and even the
mayor did not intend it to be — a merely personal invitation of likeminded private persons to jointly exercise their religious convictions.
The Court of Appeal clearly saw in the prayer an attempt “to impose a
Christian moral tone on the deliberations of council” and deemed it
impermissible in light of the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of religion.31
It was guided by the Supreme Court’s expansive framing of religious
freedom in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,32 and the more specific discussion
of public prayer in Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education.33 The latter
case concerned an Ontario regulation that allowed the recitation of Bible
readings and the Lord’s Prayer in public schools, but offered an exemption
to any student who did not wish to attend the ceremony. The Zylberberg
Court found the exemption insufficient to redeem the regulation, especially
given the sensitive content of the school environment, since both
participating in the prayer and seeking an exemption compelled students
27

Supra, note 20.
Supra, note 21.
29
Freitag, supra, note 20, at para. 4.
30
Id., at para. 6.
31
Id., at paras. 18, 20.
32
[1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.), affg [1983] A.J.
No. 766 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Big M”].
33
[1988] O.J. No. 1488, 65 O.R. (2d) 641 (Ont. C.A.), revg [1986] O.J. No. 720 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
28
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and parents to make a religious statement — a profession or rejection of
ritual and belief — which they should not have to make.
Now, there were differences between the prayer in Zylberberg and the
Penetanguishene prayer, which the Freitag Court felt the need to explain.
The first difference is that, in Zylberberg (as in Big M), the religious
practice was prescribed by law, while in Freitag it was not a mandated
practice but an act of mayoral discretion. The Freitag Court did not dwell
much on this point, but it will become a relevant distinction in MLQ v.
Saguenay. It will suffice, for now, to say that the fact that the Christian
prayer was a discretional practice as opposed to an explicit mandate
required the court to look more closely at the context and content of the
prayer, where an explicitly Christian statute or regulation would have
been dismissed out of hand.
The second difference is that Zylberberg involved children in a school
environment while Freitag concerned adults in a civic context. The
pressure felt by children in the school setting can be understood more
easily than that of the citizen attending a council meeting, which is why
the Freitag Court emphasized the concrete exclusionary effect of the
Christian prayer, the tangible ways in which Freitag was coerced. The
Freitag Court relied only on section 2(a) of the Charter to determine
that Freitag’s constitutional rights had been infringed.34 It does not
invoke section 15, the right of every individual to “the equal protection
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination” which is the
complementary premise to the guarantee of religious freedom in any
argument favouring the religious neutrality of the state. But the argument
in Freitag is simply not about religious neutrality, but about religious
coercion. The Court concluded that an overtly Christian prayer at the
opening of a municipal council meeting restricted the liberty of the
town’s non-Christian citizens by creating a climate in which full civic
participation was implicitly conditional on acquiescence to a sectarian
religious act. The Court, therefore, did not have to entertain the question
of whether impermissible coercion was neutrally applied. Neutrality, as a
concept, does not enter into it.
34
The Court also cited s. 27 of the Charter against the argument that a long-standing
practice should be allowed to stand merely on account of its historicity, suggesting that the Charter
recognized in positive law what was sociologically evident: that religious and cultural diversity had
increased in Canada over time, and that customs that presumed a homogeneously Christian nation
could not survive this change unquestioned. The multicultural argument, however, was intended to
cancel the Town of Penetanguishene’s historical argument, and not to ground Freitag’s right to a
non-confessional town meeting. Freitag, supra, note 20, at para. 46.
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Five years after Freitag, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had the
opportunity to clarify the standard of acceptable religious ceremonies in
municipal councils. The County of Renfrew had been opening council
meetings with a recitation of the Lord’s Prayer but, when faced with a
challenge by Allen — a self-identified Secular Humanist —, it changed
the oration to a non-denominational one that was based on the prayer
recited at the House of Commons.35 The Allen Court’s discussion was
focused, as in Freitag, on the presence of coercion, but the adopted
prayer was deemed so abstract that it was “not in substance a religious
observance, coercive or otherwise”.36 Mere mention of God may have
caused Allen discomfort but, in the Court’s assessment, did not make his
full civic participation conditional on a show of religious profession.
The limited judicial doctrine that emerges from the Ontario cases is
that the constitutional objection to municipal prayer is grounded on the
impermissibility of religious coercion, particularly the coercion of
citizens who might feel compelled to acquiesce in ceremonies and
declarations to which they object in order to avoid being excluded from
full participation in civic affairs. The clearer the exclusion, the stronger
the objection. Thus, a prayer or religious ceremony that is held behind
closed doors, without public participation — as is the prayer in the
House of Commons — and does not therefore force citizens to declare
their adherence or rejection of the professed faith is less vulnerable to
constitutional challenge than a public prayer at an open meeting, where
the citizen is subject to the judgment of peers and legislators.37 Likewise,
a prayer or religious ceremony identified with a specific religious
tradition — as is the Lord’s Prayer with the Christian religion — is more
35
The Allen prayer was unsurprisingly similar to the one approved by the Saguenay city
council:
Almighty God, we give thanks for the great blessings which have been bestowed on
Canada and its citizens, including the gifts of freedom, opportunity, and peace that we
enjoy. Guide us in our deliberations as [County Councillors], and strengthen us in our
awareness of our duties and responsibilities. Grant us wisdom, knowledge, and
understanding to preserve the blessings of this country for the benefit of all and to make
good laws and wise decisions. Amen.
36
Allen, supra, note 21, at para. 27.
37
The prayer in the House of Commons may also be outside the purview of judicial review
under the doctrine of parliamentary privilege, as the Court points out in MLQ v. Saguenay, supra,
note 2, at para. 142, citing Ontario (Speaker of the Legislative Assembly) v. Ontario (Human Rights
Commission), [2001] O.J. No. 2180, 54 O.R. (3d) 595 (Ont. C.A.), affg [2000] O.J. No. 3416 (Ont.
Div. Ct.). (Interestingly, the same Mr. Freitag of Penetanguishene was an intervener in this 2001
case.) Municipal councils are not protected by this doctrine, although the grounds for this are
sometimes contested. For a general discussion, see, Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, “Freedom of the
City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for Governmental Status” (2006) 44:3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 409.
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objectionable (and perhaps always impermissible) than a non-sectarian
prayer. The latter is less exclusive or, if it does exclude, it does so
trivially and insubstantially.

III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Back in the main storyline, we reach the final act, played out before
the Supreme Court.38 On all matters but one, the Supreme Court sided
with Simoneau, and against Mayor Tremblay and the City of Saguenay.
The exception was the constitutionality of the statue of the Sacred Heart
and the crucifix in the council halls. The Commission that heard the
original complaint decided to investigate the prayer, but not the religious
symbols. Because of this, the Court decided that the Quebec human
rights tribunal, which received the Commission’s recommendation,
lacked jurisdiction to decide on the religious symbols.39 Nonetheless,
although the question of the permissibility of the statue and the crucifix
could not be resolved, their presence could be taken into account in the
evaluation of the constitutionality of the municipal prayer, and indeed
provided crucial context to prove that, despite the non-sectarian words
of the invocation, the prayer was Roman Catholic in both perception
and intent.40
The essence of the Supreme Court’s decision follows. “Sponsorship of
one religious tradition by the state” Gascon J. writes, “in breach of its duty
of neutrality amounts to discrimination against all other such traditions.”41
Rather than follow the approach of the two previous municipal prayer
cases, Freitag and Allen, and hold that a legislative act or municipal
practice was unconstitutional if it amounted to religious coercion of a
38
There is an interesting disagreement among the justices about the applicable standard
of review, with Abella J. restating the deference to administrative tribunals that she articulated in
Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.),
against the majority. Some commentators have pointed out that the majority’s position on the
standard of review is confusing. See Paul Daly, “I Don’t Know: Mouvement laïque québécois v.
Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16” (April 15, 2015), Paul Daly — Administrative Law Matters
(blog), online: <http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2015/04/16/i-dont-know-mouvementlaique-quebecois-v-saguenay-city-2015-scc-16>. I would speculate that the majority’s confusion
may come from the more rigorous scrutiny of an administrative determination that Abella J.
herself — grounded on Doré — applied in Loyola High School v. Québec (Attorney General),
[2015] S.C.J. No. 12, 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.), revg [2012] J.Q. no 15094
(Que. C.A.).
39
MLQ v. Saguenay, supra, note 2, at para. 60.
40
Id., at para. 62.
41
Id., at para. 64.
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segment of the population, the majority in MLQ v. Saguenay opts for the
broader principle: that the state has a duty not only not to coerce, but also
to remain neutral between different religious confessions, and between
religious belief and non-belief. The Court formulates a test to evaluate the
neutrality of legislation and practices, which I discuss below; but first
I want to understand the principle of neutrality itself.
This position had been advanced in a dissent by LeBel J. in Témoins
de Jéhovah v. Lafontaine, extensively quoted by Gascon J.,42 and in legal
scholarship by Richard Moon.43 The language of neutrality shifts
attention away from the individual practitioner who may experience
undue pressure to conform in a specified context, to the state as creator
and sustainer of a public space that all citizens should feel welcome to
enter. Moon has previously written that the Freitag and Allen opinions
improperly and confusingly emphasized coercion as the outcome to
avoid, when it was in fact exclusion from the public realm.44
I agree with Moon that the normatively proper framework for
understanding religious freedom in a liberal democracy is some kind of
religious neutrality (although the content of that term is quite contested,
and several interpretations are probably acceptable to various degrees). I
don’t think, however, that the Freitag and Allen courts were confused in
their application of a standard of coercion. (If anything, as I explain
below, it is the Supreme Court that hasn’t clearly settled on a
constitutional principle.) The coercion standard was the more reasonable
interpretation of section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter when read alone.45
And reading section 2(a) alone, without reference to section 15 — the
right to equality — had been the norm in Canadian constitutionalism
since Big M.46
The difference might be explained by analogy to the American
constitutional framework on religious freedom. That framework
42
Lafontaine, supra, note 16, at paras. 66-67, LeBel J. dissenting, cited in MLQ v.
Saguenay, supra, note 2, at para. 71.
43
Richard Moon, “Freedom of Religion Under the Charter of Rights: The Limits of State
Neutrality” (2012) 45 U.B.C. L. Rev. 497, cited in MLQ v. Saguenay, supra, note 2, at para. 73; see
also Moon, “Government Support for Religious Practice”, supra, note 7.
44
Moon, “Government Support for Religious Practice”, id., at 229.
45
Mary Anne Waldron makes this point in her critique of Moon’s appeal to equality and
inclusion: “There appears to be no reason”, she writes, “why government support for the expression
of belief, provided such support does not actually coerce the acceptance by others of those beliefs or
impose non-trivial burdens on the practice of others of their own beliefs, should be struck down by
the courts.” M.A. Waldron, Free to Believe: Rethinking Freedom of Conscience and Religion in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), at 52.
46
Supra, note 32.
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famously consists of two clauses: the free-exercise clause and the nonestablishment clause. The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits Congress (and — through the Fourteenth
Amendment — the federated states) from making a “law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”.47
A focus on religious coercion fits the “free exercise” aspect of religious
freedom, as forced compliance with ritual or practice directly interferes
with the individual’s profession of belief. But a focus on neutrality better
fits the “non-establishment” aspect of religious freedom, since it is a
categorical prohibition aimed at the state itself, which operated prior to
and independent of any specific act of religious coercion.
The problem, of course, is that Canada is not supposed to have a nonestablishment clause. The Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1982 invokes
the supremacy of God,48 and there is extensive aid to religious schools,
both constitutionally mandated and discretional.49 In the pre-eminent
treatise of Canadian constitutional law, for instance, Peter Hogg finds
that “[t]he establishment clause, which was intended to prohibit the
establishment of an official church or religion in the United States, has
no counterpart in s. 2(a).”50 But in practice, Canadian courts have
assumed what Jeremy Patrick calls a “hidden establishment clause”
which emerges out of the functional operation of the Charter’s different
sections.51 The Court has achieved this result though relaxed rules of
standing and a very broad interpretation of coercion.52
47

United States Constitution, Amdnt 1.
Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. The extent to which the
Preamble is a theistic statement is contested, with many scholars arguing that it is a symbolic gesture
or an allusion to inalienable rights. See Jonathon W. Penney & Robert J. Danay, “The Embarrassing
Preamble? Understanding the Supremacy of God and the Charter” (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 287;
Lorne Sossin, “The ‘Supremacy of God’, Human Dignity and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms”
(2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 227; and George Egerton, “Trudeau, God, and the Canadian Constitution:
Religion, Human Rights, and Government Authority in the Making of the 1982 Constitution” in
David Lyon & Marguerite Van Die, eds, Rethinking Church, State and Modernity: Canada Between
Europe and America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), at 90.
49
On differences between Canada and the United States in this regard, see, e.g., Christopher
L. Eisgruber & Mariah Zeisberg, “Religious Freedom in Canada and the United States” (2006) 4:2
Int’l J. Const. L. 244.
50
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) § 39-2, at
979.
51
Jeremy Patrick, “Church, State, and Charter: Canada's Hidden Establishment Clause”
(2006) 14 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 25 [hereinafter “Patrick, ‘Church, State, and Charter’”]. See also
Donald L. Beschle, “Does the Establishment Clause Matter? Non-Establishment Principles in the
United States and Canada” (2002) 4:3 J. Const. L. 451.
52
Patrick, “Church, State, and Charter”, id., at 27, 46-47.
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Now, an explicit non-establishment clause is no guarantee of religious
neutrality. The same year that MLQ v. Saguenay was decided, the Supreme
Court of the United States heard a case precisely on the issue of prayer at
town council meetings and reached, by a narrow majority, an opposite
conclusion to the Supreme Court of Canada in MLQ. In Town of Greece v.
Galloway,53 a narrow majority of the American court upheld the practice
of opening the meetings of a town board with a confessional prayer. The
prayer was not offered by town officials, however, but rather by an invited
member of the clergy, and the invited minister would rotate among
different congregations in the town. Citing history and tradition, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that even sectarian prayer was allowed
provided that sufficient efforts were made to identify and invite different
congregations within town borders.54
But it is noticeable that the case was roundly criticized both within the
Court and in the legal academy.55 Justice Elena Kagan, writing for four
dissenting justices, insisted that the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution prohibits official preference of a single faith, which is
precisely what had happened in Greece. In an argument that mirrors the
Canadian case for neutrality and inclusion, Kagan protests that, when a
citizen comes before an assembly with a petition or request and is
confronted with officially sanctioned religious practices, she is forced to
either conform to the practice in order to gain official favour, or make
their dissent apparent and risk exclusion and differentiation. In other
words “when a citizen stands before her government, whether to perform
a service or request a benefit, her religious beliefs do not enter into the
picture”.56 In choosing not to participate in prayer “she thus stands at a
remove, based solely on religion, from her fellow citizens and her elected
representatives.”57 The relevance of this is highlighted (though I don’t
think it is determined) in the composition of the majority and the
minority of the Court in Town of Greece. All members of the majority are
Roman Catholic, a group that just a few decades before was more likely
to oppose denominational prayers on the grounds that they were
134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) [hereinafter “Town of Greece”].
Justice Breyer’s dissent points out, however, that the list of congregations identified was
drawn from a Christian phone guide. Only when the lawsuit was filed did the town make more
aggressive efforts to contact non-Christian ministers of religion. Id., at 1839, Breyer J. dissenting.
55
Academic reaction to the decision was mixed, but mostly critical. See, e.g., “Legislative
Prayer Symposium” SCOTUSBlog (Blog), online: <http://www.scotusblog.com/category/specialfeatures/town-of-greece-symposium/>.
56
Town of Greece, supra, note 53, at 1843-44, Kagan J. dissenting.
57
Id., at 1850, Kagan J. dissenting.
53
54
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excessively Protestant, or else dilute them of meaning and render them as
“civil religion”.58 Roman Catholics are now welcome in the American
Christian mainstream, but Kagan J. reminds the Court that some remain
outside that narrative and face continued symbolic exclusion.

IV. TOO MUCH NARRATIVE: CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION AS SOCIOLOGY
I suggested above that, even if the Freitag and Allen Courts were
ultimately wrong about the principle that should have governed the
analysis of municipal prayers, it is the Supreme Court of Canada who
is unclear, perhaps even confused, about the issue. This suspicion is
explained in Richard Moon’s recent analysis of MLQ v. Saguenay,
regarding the Court’s test for evaluating the religious neutrality of state
legislation and practices.59 The test is oddly bifurcated. On one hand, “[a]
provision of a statute, of regulations or of a by-law will be inoperative
if its purpose is religious and therefore cannot be reconciled with the
state’s duty of neutrality.”60 On the other hand, where “a complaint of
discrimination based on religion concerns a state practice, the alleged
breach of the duty of neutrality must be established by proving that the
state is professing, adopting or favouring one belief to the exclusion of
all others and that the exclusion has resulted in interference with the
complainant’s freedom of conscience and religion.”61 It seems, given the
comparative analysis in the last section, that legislation is strictly
governed by a principle of non-establishment, while practices are
governed both by non-establishment and free exercise principles. Why
the difference?
Moon suggests that the second element of the test — interference with
a person’s freedom of religion or conscience — is redundant.62 This may
Consider, for instance, William Brennan’s dissent in Marsh v. Chambers, in which he
stunningly reversed his own position in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213
(1963). “[A]ny practice of legislative prayer”, Brennan J. writes in Marsh, “even if it might look
‘nonsectarian’ to nine Justices of the Supreme Court, will inevitably and continuously involve the
State in one or another religious debate. Prayer is serious business — serious theological business —
and it is not a mere ‘acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country’ for
the State to immerse itself in that business.” Marsh v. Chambers, supra, note 25, at 819.
59
Richard Moon, “Neutrality and Prayers: Mouvement laique v. Saguenay” (2015) 4
Oxford J. L. & Religion 512.
60
MLQ v. Saguenay, supra, note 2, at para. 81.
61
Id., at para. 83.
62
Moon, “Neutrality and Prayers”, supra, note 59, at 518.
58
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indicate, he speculates, the Court’s unwillingness to fully embrace the
neutrality principle, or it may indicate the Court’s anticipation of other
controversies, most likely those threatened by the ill-fated Quebec
Charter of Values, which would have prohibited civil servants from
wearing conspicuous religious symbols while performing their duties on
the view that this amounted to religious expression by the state. I agree
with Moon that such religious garb “is an act of personal religious
expression, rather than a state act of religious favouritism”63 and that the
courts should not interfere with civil servants’ sartorial choices. But I
take the speculative worry as another reason to pay closer attention to the
context of religious practice in Quebec and its implications for
constitutional interpretation. In particular, the Court may be willing to
allow some forms of religious expression (especially historical or generic
symbols or practices) if it deems their infringement on religious freedom
trivial and insubstantial. The degree of triviality may be a function of the
intensity of religious conflict, and this may in turn depend on historical
factors not present at all times or across all areas of the country.
What is more worrying about the Canadian “hidden” nonestablishment principle is that it seems to emerge from the Supreme
Court’s understanding of what religious freedom in the Charter ought to
mean, regardless of what it says. The Court seems to admit as much in
MLQ v. Saguenay, where Gascon J. writes that “[n]either the Quebec
Charter nor the Canadian Charter expressly imposes a duty of religious
neutrality on the state. This duty results from an evolving interpretation
of freedom of conscience and religion.”64
This is sociological narrative substituting for constitutional doctrine.
But in the context of the complete text of the Charter, it is completely
unnecessary. It would hardly be a stretch of the legal imagination — and
would, instead, be an extension of sound statutory interpretation — to
read the protection of religious freedom in section 2(a) of the Canadian
Charter together with the guarantee of equality in section 15. But the
Supreme Court in MLQ v. Saguenay does not do this, and neither did the
Freitag and Allen Courts. This is especially remarkable in MLQ v.
Saguenay since the legislation that was actually invoked in the case was
not section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter but rather sections 3 and 10 of
the Quebec Charter, that is, both the religious freedom and the guarantee
of “equal recognition and exercise of … human rights and freedoms”.
63
64

Id.
MLQ v. Saguenay, supra, note 2, at para. 71.
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The assumption — which is not without problems, and which I take up
below — that “[b]ecause of the similarity between s. 3 of the Quebec
Charter and s. 2 of the Canadian Charter, it is well established that s. 3
should be interpreted in light of the principles that have been developed
in relation to the application of the Canadian Charter”65 is not extended
to section 10 of the Quebec Charter which, by this reasoning, should find
its parallel in section 15 of its Canadian counterpart.
It is perhaps uncharitable to conclude that Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence has become unmoored from the constitutional text to such
an extent that the Supreme Court prefers to appeal to “the evolution of
Canadian society” when grounding the principle of religious neutrality of
the state, rather than return to the document even when the text would
yield the same desired result. This may reflect a kind of common-law
constitutionalism where the content of rights evolves through courts’
interpretation of general principles rather than statutory construction.66
The text of the Charter fades from view — relegated to the status
of principle or value, and not norm — and instead Dickson J.’s
interpretation of religious freedom under section 2(a) of the Canadian
Charter becomes the effective source of law. A certain confirmation of
this attitude comes from knowing that, when the Big M case was
litigated, section 15 of the Charter had not yet come into effect. That
chapter of Canadian constitutionalism, as it were, was still listed as
“forthcoming”. The spirit of state neutrality in Canadian religious liberty,
which is so tied to Dickson J.’s discussion, forcibly developed from the
guarantee of freedom of religion because the more obvious source was
not available at its origin. But now that section 15 is in effect, it is only
the reluctance to go back to the text to determine constitutional norms
that allows this strange situation to continue uncorrected.
65

Id., at para. 68.
But consider Robert Leckey’s caution, in a comparative analysis of bills of rights in
common-law countries, that
… attention to country-specific text need not attract charges of formalism or evoke arid
versions of originalism. It does not presume that constitutional text has a fixed,
uncontroversial meaning. What it assumes is that a bill of rights’ text and the set of
plausible meanings that it generates within its community of readers claim a weight in
practical reasoning that is distinct from liberal political theorists’ conception of the
optimal relationship between branches of government. To return to Allan’s term, the text
of a bill of rights is not “inessential”. Regarding it as such betrays practices and
commitments that, if not conceptually linked to ordering by law, run nevertheless
through Western legal practice.
Robert Leckey, Bills of Rights in the Common Law (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,
2015), at 25.
66
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A more textualist interpretive methodology would, perhaps, limit the
Court’s discretion in other cases where the constitutional text was not so
accommodating. But that is, of course, the point of a written constitution:
to constrain the deliberation and action of government, including the
judicial branch.

V. NOT ENOUGH NARRATIVE: PROVINCIAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Finally, I want to consider the Court’s cursory and largely
unexamined reference to statutory interpretation of provincial rights
instruments. As I mentioned above, the Court has preferred to interpret
the clauses of provincial human rights charters in light of the principles
that guide interpretation of their federal counterparts.67 This methodology
is based on assumptions about the identity of purpose and similarity of
language in the respective statutes. In some (perhaps most) cases, similar
interpretation may be sound. But as a general principle of interpretation,
the assumption is unwarranted.
Now, this proposition may seem strange at first glance, given the
constitutional hierarchy between provincial human rights instruments
and the Canadian Charter. It is true, as the Court has clearly stated, that
“human rights legislation must conform to constitutional norms,
including those set out in the Canadian Charter.” But in the same breath,
it acknowledges that “there is no requirement that the provisions of the
[Quebec] Charter mirror those of the Canadian Charter”. The provincial
charter must be interpreted “in light of” the Canadian Charter in the
sense that “when a statutory provision is open to more than one
interpretation, it must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
provisions of the Canadian Charter.”68 What does consistency with the
Canadian Charter mean in this context? It cannot mean identity of
meaning, given the immediately preceding acknowledgment; this would
effectively render most provisions of all provincial human rights
instruments redundant. It must mean, rather, a presumption of
constitutionality, that is, the conscientious rejection of any possible
67
Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal
(City), [2000] S.C.J. No. 24, 2000 SCC 27, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665, at para. 42 (S.C.C.), affg [1998]
J.Q. no 369 (Que. C.A.), cited as “Boisbriand” in MLQ v. Saguenay, supra, note 2, at para. 68.
68
Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal
(City), id., at para. 42. The decision is cited approvingly in MLQ v. Saguenay, supra, note 2, at paras. 63,
68, 83, and 152.
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interpretation of the provincial instrument that would put it at odds with
the federal Charter. But this presumption may still leave several
interpretations available to the courts. The initial stem in such an inquiry,
then, should be to discern the various possible interpretations of the
provincial human rights instrument on its own terms,69 and select the
most plausible one that passes the Canadian Charter’s constitutional
threshold.70 So a provincial human rights instrument could recognize
rights on which the Canadian Charter is silent, or require certain actions
of the government which the Canadian Charter merely permits, or place a
higher threshold on “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.71
Another reason why the proposition may seem strange is because of
jurists’ natural (and reasonable) propensity to interpret similar words in
similar ways. But excessive attention to semantics and grammar can
obscure as much as illuminate the meaning of a text. To show this I draw
on Robert Cover’s celebrated article, “Nomos and Narrative”, which
makes a compelling case for going beyond “[t]he rules and principles of
justice, the formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of a social
order”72 when trying to understand the normative orders in which legal
actors operate. Positive instruments of law such as the constitutional and
quasi-constitutional legislation at play here are inscribed in a cultural and
69
The terms on which the provincial charter should be understood may include, of course,
the provincial legislators’ knowledge of the Canadian Charter and their intent, perhaps explicit in
legislative records, to make the provincial instrument convergent or divergent from its federal
counterpart. This would likely not be the case in Quebec, however, as the Quebec Charter precedes
the Canadian one by six years.
70
This strategy resembles the “margin of appreciation” doctrine in European Court of
Human Rights (“ECHR”) jurisprudence, which allows the ECHR to defer to states in the
implementation of certain provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights. I will not delve
into the analogy here, however, because the precise scope and application of such a doctrine may be
decidedly shaped by constitutional differences (e.g., between a Europe of sovereign states and a
Canada of federated provinces). I do note, however, that the doctrine was invoked by the EHCR to
allow the continued presence of crucifixes in Italian public schools in Lautsi v. Italy, supra, note 24.
71
James Gardner gives several illuminating examples from the American context. Several
states have express constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures that are
literally or substantially identical to the language of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In some states (like New York) the state courts have interpreted the state constitutional
protection to be identical to the federal protection, so that state police officers are subject to the same
rules regarding, for example, exclusion of evidence. In other states (like Massachusetts) the state
courts have interpreted the state constitution to provide broader protection in some areas and
narrower protection in others. James Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions: A Jurisprudence of
Function in a Federal System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), at 2-11 and 166. This
interpretive pluralism may be facilitated by the non-unitary court system of the American federation
but, as I will suggest below, it is hardly impossible even in a unitary system.
72
Cover, supra, note 1, at 4.
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symbolic context, and apart from this context, legal norms are often
unintelligible or woefully misunderstood.
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution
there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the
context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely
a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.
In this normative world, law and narrative are inseparably related.
Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in discourse —
to be supplied with history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation
and purpose.73

The work of legal interpretation, from the narrowest statutory rule to
the broadest constitutional principle, is never a purely abstract and
autonomous practice. It is always dependent on the “interpretive
commitments” shared by judges and attorneys, officials and clients.
Absent these shared commitments, the law will seem to some parties to
be an alien imposition or an arbitrary act of mere coercion, even as it
remains intelligible and presumptively legitimate to the other party. It is
not enough that there be a set of positive norms to which all parties make
reference; the meaning of these norms, which goes beyond the letter,
must be shared as well, lest the reasons that ground the legitimacy of law
for some undermine that legitimacy for others. Cover explains:
If there existed two legal orders with identical legal precepts and
identical, predictable patterns of public force, they would nonetheless
differ essentially in meaning if, in one of the orders, the precepts were
universally venerated while in the other they were regarded by many as
fundamentally unjust.74

It is wrong to assume, then, that a legal formula — a phrase in a
contract, an article in a statute, a constitutional principle — will carry the
same meaning in different narrative contexts. The letter of the law is not
a complete nomos; it carries with it assumptions about historical
experience and social reality. That is not to say that any interpretation
goes, that there is no correct interpretation of legal phenomena, that the
law is radically indeterminate. It is to say that the correct interpretation
of a legal norm (if there is one) must take account of social meaning, and

73
74

Id., at 4-5 (internal citations omitted).
Id., at 7.
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therefore that interpretation of a similar legal norm may be different in
different contexts.
But the relationship between norm and narrative goes both ways.
Norms are unintelligible — or have their meaning distorted — if they are
not understood in the context of the historical, political, economic and
social narratives from which they emerge and in which they remain
inscribed. But legal narratives in particular make no sense without
reference to norms. Part of the meaning of legal regulation is that it
references posited norms as opposed to prudential “rules of thumb” or
inchoate dispositions of character.75 What it means for a community to be
governed by law is that its members communicate their expectations and
obligations to each other by reference to these norms and expect these to
count as reasons for action in their discourse.
The interplay of norm and narrative in the construction of the nomos
demands a balance between the narrative and the norm. This is especially
true in a “chartered” community, one which has deliberately and expressly
given itself a fundamental law. The charter serves a dual purpose in such a
community: it is a norm, or a set of norms, to which legal actors are
expected to make reference in their reasoning; but it is also a historically
situated event, or combination of events, which constitute a chapter in the
story of the community. This notion of a chartered community suggests the
greater attention to the constitutional text discussed above. But it also
demands that we take seriously the difference between different charters
emerging from different narratives, even if their languages are similar. The
narrative of the Charter asks that we take charters seriously, and ties the
problem of interpreting a written constitution to the problem of federalism.
The similarity that the Supreme Court of Canada finds between the
Canadian Charter and the Quebec Charter (and similar provincial
legislation), of course, is at the level of the text (and even that claim is
questionable, as is evident in the mention of God in the Canadian
document and its absence in the Quebec one). It ignores the entire
context in which the two instruments are inscribed, and has the effect of

75
Id., at 7-8. Of course, through a rule or standard, law may attempt to establish a baseline
for prudence or formalize a disposition of character, as is the case with the reasonable person or the
bon père de famille. Legal reasoning, however, mediates prudence or character through the rule
rather than referencing it directly. If this reading of Cover is objectionable because it reconciles him
with legal positivism, I reply by suggesting that Cover’s objections to positivism are misguided. See
V.M. Muñiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of Pluralism: on the authority of associations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), Chapter 6 and 137-38.
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distorting the meaning and the application of both the Canadian and the
Quebec Charters, especially on matters of freedom of religion.
The narrative of secularism in Quebec recommends against reading
the provisions of the Quebec Charter related to freedom of religion as
necessarily consonant with those in the Canadian Charter. I suggested
above, when discussing Richard Moon’s worries about the bifurcated
test for state religious neutrality in MLQ v. Saguenay, that some
manifestations of religion could be considered trivial in some contexts
and not others, and that retaining a “free exercise” element in the
analysis of offending practices could help distinguish between degrees of
exclusion. The facts in the Saguenay controversy suggest this may have
been one such case.
The three and a half decades since the adoption of the Canadian
Charter have witnessed a secular change — in all senses of the term — in
Canadian religiosity, from an overwhelmingly Christian nation to one
marked, on the one hand, by increasing religious diversity and, on the
other, by disaffiliation from established churches and marked reduction
in professed religious belief.76 At the same time, the Charter itself has
emerged as a paramount source of Canadian identity (eclipsing even
hockey, the national sport).77 The courts have closely followed this trend,
developing a doctrine of state neutrality towards religious practice and
belief out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience
and religion. Yet the precise structure of neutrality has never been clear,
and courts — from the provincial human rights tribunals to the Supreme
Court — have oscillated between two poles: prohibition of coercive
public endorsement of religious expression, and equitable support for
religious activities.
The same oscillation is evident in the judicial interpretation of the
Quebec Charter, but here the fluctuations are markedly more intense. The
Quebec Charter precedes its Canadian equivalent by six years. It was not
the first provincial human rights charter, but it “stands out from the
crowd of provincial statutes on this matter, because it protects a more
comprehensive range of fundamental rights, including certain rights that
76
Pew Research Center, “Canada’s Changing Religious Landscape”, online: <http://www.
pewforum.org/2013/06/27/canadas-changing-religious-landscape/>.
77
Statistics Canada, “Canadian Identity, 2013”, online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89652-x/89-652-x2015005-eng.pdf>. As an anonymous reviewer rightly points out, hockey is only the
national winter sport of Canada, and lacrosse the national summer sport: National Sports of Canada
Act, S.C. 1994, c. 16, s. 2. I would argue, however, that of these only hockey has attained religious
status.
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are unique to Quebec”.78 The Quebec Charter is also an important marker
of collective identity, a unique (if unofficial) constitution that sets the
province apart and provides a distinctive point of normative reference for
its residents.79 It is one of the institutional achievements of the Quiet
Revolution, a period of economic and cultural change that, among other
things, saw the rapid secularization of Quebec society and the drastic
reduction of influence of the Roman Catholic Church in the province.
But for many Quebecers, especially in the areas outside of Montreal, the
abandonment of religious practice (or even belief) did not mean an
abandonment of religious identity, as this is closely bound with the
history of the province and identified with its Francophone heritage. The
two aspects of the Quiet Revolution — secularization and affirmation of
identity — reveal themselves in constant tensions between secularists
who wish to import from France the laïcité and conservatives who would
retain the symbols of the Church as protection against cultural dilution.
The political synthesis of both positions leads to absurd pronouncements:
thus an avid secularist party leader could defend the permanence of
a crucifix on the wall of the National Assembly because “c’est pas la
religion, c’est le patrimoine”.80
Against Jean Tremblay’s confessional narrative and the MLQ’s
radical secularist one, we may add a conciliatory vision of a pluralist
Quebec society, best expressed in the report of the Commission de
consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux differences
culturelles81 — the famous Bouchard-Taylor Commission — and in
Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure’s later reformulation of the
philosophical principles that animated the conclusions of that inquiry.
The authors emphasize the distinct history of church-state relations in
the province, with its internal tensions and its complex relations to the
broader Canadian context. The tentative conclusion, reached by the
Commission, is that “open secularism best allowed respect both for
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the equality of citizens and for their freedom of conscience and of religion.”82
That conclusion is certainly contested in the province — though it seems
most acceptable to me — but what is important about it is the careful
consideration of historical context which creates a distinct narrative of
constitutional principles in Quebec, one not necessarily shared by the rest
of the country.83
In the context in which the prayer controversy originates (both the
general historical context and the specific confrontation between the
crusading mayor and the radical secularist movement) no concession to
either side could be deemed trivial or insubstantial. Attention should turn
to the specifics of a case — the symbols and ceremonies surrounding a
prayer, the declarations of government officials to the press. Essentially
the same prayer could be recited in the Town of Renfrew without much
concern, but in Saguenay, with the accompanying ritual and mayoral
bravado, it was fighting words. It may be useful to have a constitutional
test that could distinguish between the two contexts while holding on to
the principle of neutrality. But this can only be done if neutrality is seen
not only as a norm but also as a developing narrative in a chartered
federation.
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